The latest instance occurred on 12 November in Dublin, where the ninth European Political Community summit was taking place. Rama confirmed that the NATO summit would not take place the following year, a statement that was portrayed by online media outlets and on social media as the cancellation of the summit and a rejection of Tirana.

“Reuters: NATO says ‘NO’ to Tirana, reason revealed!” appeared in several articles published by online media outlets in Albania, presenting misleading headlines about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s summit.

However, in its report on 12 November, the international news agency Reuters quoted Prime Minister Edi Rama as saying that no consensus had been reached on the date of the summit and that it would not take place in 2027. Rama went on to add that if a summit were to take place in 2028, it would be held in Tirana.

Rama’s statement to the media from Dublin, published on the Prime Minister’s Office website, also confirms that Albania remains the host of the next NATO summit.

“Of course, Albania is envisaged as the next host of the NATO summit. The issue is that no consensus has been reached on when the summit will take place. It is certain that it will not be in 2027. If there is a summit in 2028, it will take place in Tirana, and there is no doubt about that,” Rama stated.

Beyond the Albanian Prime Minister’s statement, NATO itself has also confirmed that Albania remains the host country of the next summit, in a response to the Reuters news agency.

“The next NATO summit will be held in Albania. A decision on the date has not yet been taken,” a NATO official stated.

The decision to hold the NATO summit in Albania was made in June 2025, during the meeting of heads of state and government of member countries in The Hague. In the joint declaration adopted at the conclusion of the summit, member countries announced that the next meeting would take place in Türkiye in 2026, followed by a meeting in Albania, without specifying the year in which it would be held.

However, in Albania, discussions about the date of the summit were accompanied by the circulation of articles referring to the rejection of Tirana, the cancellation of the summit and the withdrawal of Albania’s right to host it. In other publications, Rama’s statement from Dublin was also presented as an announcement that the summit had been cancelled.

In some publications, the fact that the summit would not take place in 2027 was presented as a consequence of a clashwith US President Donald Trump, while in others it was presented as the result of a loss of confidence in Albania due to corruption and the government’s links to crime.

Some of the reporting in the Albanian media focused solely on the news that the summit would not take place the following year. The other part of Rama’s statement, concerning the possibility of holding the meeting in Albania in another year, was overlooked.

Discussions among NATO member countries about the next summit had been under way for months. The question was whether the summit would take place in 2027 or in another year, while Albania had already been designated as the host country.

In July 2026, at the conclusion of the NATO summit in Ankara, the Alliance’s Secretary General, Mark Rutte, also confirmed that the next summit would take place in Albania, but clarified that its date had not yet been determined.

On 3 November, just nine days before Rama’s statement from Dublin, the Albanian Prime Minister met with Rutte in Brussels. Following the meeting, the Ministry of Defence announced that the decision to hold the next NATO summit in Tirana had been reconfirmed, but no date had been specified.

The summits organised by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, known as NATO summits, bring together the heads of state and government of member countries to discuss security issues and make decisions about the future direction of the Alliance.

Hosting such a meeting in Albania would mark an important milestone in the country’s relations with its allies since joining NATO in 2009.

Earlier, in June 2026, the Reuters news agency reported that plans to hold the summit in Albania in 2027 had been called into question due to opposition from the US administration and dissatisfaction among some member countries over Albania’s low defence spending.

In November, the international media outlet Politico reported that the reasons for the allies’ reluctance to hold the summit in 2027 also included the high costs of such a meeting and concerns that it could give the US President another opportunity to criticise the Alliance.

However, none of these reports announced a decision by NATO to withdraw Albania’s right to host the summit or a decision by US President Donald Trump to block it from taking place in Tirana.

The news that the NATO summit would not be held in Tirana the following year also prompted reactions in Albanian politics, with the opposition reminding Rama of the promise he had made two years earlier.

Democratic Party MP Tritan Shehu claimed that the cancellation of the summit was linked to a loss of confidence in Albania due to corruption and the government’s links to crime. However, these were accusations made by the opposition MP, rather than reasons made public by NATO for the summit not taking place in 2027.

Democratic Party MP Flamur Noka took a similar approach, publishing a video on Instagram in which he juxtaposed Rama’s earlier statement about hosting the summit in 2027 with his latest statement from Dublin.

“Now all he has left to promise is the Surrel Summit,” Noka wrote, mocking the Prime Minister’s “unfulfilled promise”.

Monitoring by Amfora Media’s Resilience Observatory shows that, in addition to claims about the cancellation of the NATO summit in Albania, various interpretations of the reasons for it not taking place in 2027 also circulated in online media. The reported opposition from the US administration was presented as a decision by President Donald Trump to block the summit, while political accusations of corruption and a loss of confidence in the Albanian government were presented as explanations for this development.

Despite these claims, NATO’s official documents contradict these publications, and statements by its representatives to date confirm that Albania remains the host country of the next summit. What has yet to be determined is when the meeting will take place.

The post Misleading Claims Portrayed the NATO Summit in Tirana as Cancelled first appeared on Amfora.

The meetings took place from 19 to 23 October, with most of Emiri’s meetings held individually with representatives of European Union institutions, providing opportunities for direct discussions on issues concerning Albania and the Western Balkans.

At the European Parliament, the programme included an introduction to how decisions are made within the EU, the role of Members of the European Parliament and the institution’s communication with citizens. Participants visited the European Parliament’s premises and learned about the services used to inform the public, including audiovisual services.

An important part of the visit was devoted to the European integration of Albania and the Western Balkans. At the European Commission, Emiri held meetings with representatives of departments responsible for the EU enlargement process, focusing on developments in the region and the candidate countries’ path towards membership.

Disinformation and the influence of foreign actors in the spread of manipulative information were among the topics discussed during meetings with representatives of the European Commission and the European External Action Service. These bodies address challenges related to information manipulation and public communication, including in the Western Balkans.

Transparency and institutional accountability to citizens were addressed during meetings with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Ombudsman. These institutions are responsible, respectively, for investigating fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests and examining complaints concerning maladministration within European institutions.

The visit also included meetings with organisations that support independent journalism and civil society. Among them were the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), an organisation that has previously supported the work of Amfora Media, as well as Civitates and Journalismfund Europe. Discussions focused on supporting independent media and strengthening civil society organisations in the Western Balkans.

During the meetings in Brussels, Emiri presented Amfora Media’s work in independent and investigative journalism, as well as the Resilience Observatory, an initiative of the Amfora Centre focused on monitoring and analysing disinformation, information manipulation and foreign interference in the information environment.

During the programme, participants also attended a European Commission press conference, visited the European Council’s Europa building and the House of European History. Established in 1974, the European Union Visitors Programme (EUVP) is a joint initiative of the European Parliament and the European Commission, aimed at strengthening relations with professionals and representatives of society from countries outside the EU. Participants are selected through an institutional selection process and follow personalised programmes tailored to their professional profiles and interests, holding direct meetings with representatives of European institutions.

The programme also provided opportunities to exchange experiences with international professionals from the media, civil society and politics, representing Europe, the United States of America, Asia and Africa. Participation in this professional network gave Amfora the opportunity to present its experience in independent journalism in Albania, learn about different international practices and expand its professional contacts for potential future collaborations.

The post Amfora Director Geri Emiri Meets with Representatives of EU Institutions in Brussels first appeared on Amfora.

“Those representatives from Doma have come, obviously to provoke us. Come on, let’s gather the people and go defend our waters,” he tells his fellow villagers, who had agreed to speak with us for an interview.

“Yes, yes, come on, let’s go straight there,” the residents of Kurdari respond, almost in unison.

Moments later, the doors of all the cars parked nearby slam shut in rapid succession. Others arrive on motorcycles and quickly follow the vehicles as soon as they hear that workers from the company constructing the hydropower plant have entered the area.

Upon reaching the entrance to the village, like a well-rehearsed theatre troupe, they restrain their emotions and wait for the next act of a drama they have been performing for years. Once again, the pickup truck carrying the company’s workers leaves the village empty-handed.

Kurdari is the “agricultural heart” of the Mat region, supplying several towns and surrounding villages with agricultural produce. All of this is made possible by the Lusa Stream (Përroi i Lusës), which flows for 18 kilometres from the Balgjaj Lakes area before emptying into the Mat River.

After winning several battles over the years to protect this stream from various companies, residents have been opposing the construction of another hydropower plant, called “Doma”, since 2020.

“We have sworn that we will not allow hydropower plants to be built in Kurdari because water is life. Even the children in kindergarten and school are watching us. They are stressed because they, too, are thinking about their future, knowing that life without water is impossible,” said Rexhep Kuleni, a resident of Kurdari, firmly.

The story of this village in the Mat region mirrors a conflict that has been recurring for years in many local communities across Albania and the wider Balkans, where the construction of small hydropower plants has pitted investors’ interests against those of residents who depend on water resources.

In Albania, after coming to power in 2013, the Socialist Party promised a comprehensive review of concession contracts and transparency regarding their legality. Yet, 13 years later, largely “out of the public eye”, projects to harness rivers for hydropower generation continue to advance much as they did a decade ago.

Amfora, an independent Albanian media outlet focusing on investigative journalism and local communities, analysed data provided by the National Agency of Natural Resources (AKBN), identifying 270 administrative records relating to hydropower contracts and projects. Of these, 165 (61.1%) are classified as being in the production phase, 31 (11.5%) are under construction, and construction work has yet to begin on 74 (27.4%).

Behind the hydropower plants opposed by villagers and the court proceedings in which these disputes often end lies a much broader picture of the hydropower exploitation of Albania’s rivers. Data analysed by Media Amfora, based on the register of the Water Resources Management Agency (AMBU), show that Dibër leads with 81 preliminary groupings of hydropower projects, followed by Elbasan with 80, Kukës with 58, and Shkodër with 56.

The phenomenon has affected the Western Balkans for years. According to the scientific report “State of Balkan Rivers 2025”, prepared for the organisations Riverwatch and EuroNatur, the Balkans lost approximately 2,450 kilometres of near-natural river stretches between 2012 and 2025. The proportion of river stretches classified as near-natural declined from 30% to 23%, with hydropower development identified as one of the main drivers of their degradation.

To document the challenges faced by local communities confronting hydropower projects beyond Albania, Media Amfora extended its investigation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing on the Pliva River, where residents have been opposing the construction of the “Jovići” hydropower plant for years. The project has a capacity of just 0.6 megawatts, and although the courts have annulled three environmental permits, it has still not been definitively abandoned.

“No amount of revenue from the electricity that would be generated by the planned hydropower plant could compensate for the destruction of the Pliva River’s natural environment,” explained hydrologist Muriz Spahić.

The Ghosts of the Balkan Mountains

In Albania, around 15 kilometres from Kurdari, in the village of Guri i Bardhë, perched like a crown above the Mat River valley, another hydropower project appears and disappears from time to time, reviving residents’ fears of losing their water.

The “Guri i Bardhë 1 and 2” hydropower plants, developed by the company Gealb Energy, are based on a concession contract signed in 2017. In March 2021, following a petition by residents opposing the hydropower project, it received a negative environmental assessment, as the company had failed to comply with repeated requests from the National Environment Agency (AKM) to conduct a new public hearing.

Nearly five years after disappearing from the scene, the company resurfaced on 16 July 2026 with a new application. The AKM subsequently required, in accordance with the law, a consultation process involving broad participation from residents of every affected village.

“They disappeared for about three or four years, and now they have started holding public hearings again. On 29 September, they once again held one secretly, in a villager’s house at the far end of the village,” Lavdrim Xira, a resident of Guri i Bardhë, told Amfora.

“We found out about it a week later, and from what we understand, they intend to submit another application to obtain the environmental permit, because that is their ultimate goal,” he explained, referring to the company’s latest actions.

The original footprint of the “Guri i Bardhë 1” hydropower project extended into the “Mali me Gropa–Bizë–Martanesh” Protected Area, while the revised project was relocated outside its boundaries. Nevertheless, an assessment by the Dibër Regional Environmental Agency, reviewed by Amfora, highlighted the proximity of two water intake structures to the protected area’s boundary.

“Potential impacts include the loss of forest areas and forest ecosystem services, habitat fragmentation, disturbance of wildlife, alterations to the natural flow of water, among others,” the environmental authorities noted in their assessment of the project’s possible impacts.

For local residents, this project has been looming over the village for almost a decade, and its return has mobilised not only those who live there but also members of the community living abroad. Lavdrim Xira explains that, while he has been trying year after year to attract tourists from across Europe to discover Guri i Bardhë, the hydropower development plans could undermine his dream of developing tourism in the village.

“This village is one of the 100 designated tourist villages and has great potential because it is very close to the capital. Yet there are two or three hydropower plants planned, right through the valley that runs across the entire village. That would amount to total devastation,” Xira explained.

Amfora identified several irregularities in the procedures that led to the project’s environmental approval in February 2022, according to an audit by Albania’s Supreme State Audit Institution. The report found that although the Municipality of Klos had previously submitted a negative opinion, together with a petition from residents, an “automatic approval by tacit consent” was recorded in the electronic system in September 2021.

According to Danjel Bica, an environmental engineer and executive director of the association “Young Environmental Experts” in Bulqizë, the methods used to assess the environmental impacts of hydropower projects also leave room for technical interpretation.

“The environmental impact assessments that are prepared conclude that hydropower plants have no environmental impact. This is contradictory because when you intervene in the environment, dig a canal, cut down forests, pour concrete, and then claim there is no environmental impact, that is fundamentally wrong from the outset,” Bica emphasised.

Although the project has twice failed to secure the green light from environmental authorities, it is once again attempting to move forward this autumn, facing residents who have mobilised against it for the fourth time.

“On the one hand, communities are kept in the dark, neither consulted nor heard. On the other hand, developers have all the access and information they need, and can certainly obtain all the necessary permits by bypassing the community, or at least by pretending that they have consulted it,” explained environmental activist Besjana Guri, who described the proliferation of small hydropower plants in the Balkans as an “epidemic” affecting rivers and streams throughout the region.

Three Environmental Permits Annulled on the Pliva River, Yet the Project Remains

A similar story is unfolding on the Pliva River in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the “Jovići” hydropower plant remains a project whose looming presence has threatened the residents of the village of Pljeva for the past 20 years.

The concession agreement was signed in February 2006, with an initial deadline of just 21 months to complete the investment. However, the hydropower plant was never built, and the contract was transferred to another company in 2016.

In December 2023, the authorities of Republika Srpska altered the proposed boundaries of a future protected area, excluding the site of the hydropower plant. Unlike in Guri i Bardhë, where the project’s footprint was modified, on the Pliva River it was the planned boundary of the protected area that was changed.

The dispute with the authorities continued in the courts. During 2025, the ministry responsible for environmental protection in Republika Srpska issued three environmental permits for the “Jovići” hydropower plant, but all three were annulled by the District Court in Banja Luka. The most recent annulment came in June 2026. Nevertheless, the concession was not terminated, and while the authorities await the conclusion of the judicial proceedings, residents continue to demand protection for the river.

For hydrologist Muriz Spahić, founder of the Association of Geographers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and former dean of the Faculty of Science in Sarajevo, interventions in the Pliva River threaten an irreplaceable natural heritage.

“All human interventions, whether planned or already underway on the Pliva River, are damaging an irreplaceable natural environment. They are permanently destroying what took nature more than two million years to create,” he warned.

Meanwhile, Bosnian scientist Dalibor Ballian, a professor at the Faculty of Forestry at the University of Sarajevo and a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, emphasised the importance of water resources for future generations.

“The question is whether having drinking water is more important to us than generating a few kilowatts from a hydropower plant,” Ballian said. Referring to the purity of the Pliva’s water sources, he warned: “Let us not destroy it. We will need it in the future, for ourselves, our children and our grandchildren.”

According to the scientific report “State of Balkan Rivers 2025”, Albania, like Bosnia and Herzegovina, has recorded one of the most significant deteriorations in river conditions in the region. The proportion of river stretches classified as near-natural declined from 68% in 2012 to 40% in 2025, a decrease of 28 percentage points.

Between 2018 and 2025 alone, the total length of these river stretches fell from 3,812 kilometres to 2,668 kilometres. Researchers identify hydropower plant construction and interventions altering natural river flows as major drivers of degradation, alongside sediment extraction and other infrastructure developments.

“In many cases, water resources have been exploited indiscriminately, leaving families and farmers without access to water supplies or the means to carry out their agricultural activities,” said economist Klodian Muço, referring to hydropower concession policies and practices in Albania and the wider Balkan context.

According to Muço, hydropower plants have contributed to electricity generation, but these benefits must be weighed against the financial support provided, the exploitation of water resources and the long-term costs.

“Climate change is making electricity generation increasingly unpredictable, as the installed capacity of a hydropower plant does not guarantee the same level of energy production throughout the year,” Muço observed.

For environmental engineer Danjel Bica, the impact of these hydropower plants on local economies is negligible.

“Once a hydropower plant has been built, two or three people might be employed. These hydropower plants are not necessary on the grounds that they generate income for local communities,” Bica explained.

In its 2025 report, the European Commission found that no progress had been made under Chapter 27, covering the environment and climate change. Brussels called for the full implementation of environmental impact assessment legislation, compliance with obligations concerning water protection, and the assurance of public participation in decision-making.

The concentration of small hydropower plants in Albania becomes even more apparent when examining the country’s river basins. Of the 440 identified project groupings, 150 are located in the Drin-Buna basin, 99 in the Shkumbin basin and 98 in the Mat basin. Together, these three basins account for nearly 79% of the consolidated records, indicating that interest in hydropower development has been concentrated in some of the country’s major river systems.

In Kurdari, Residents “Abandon Their Fields” to Defend Their Water

In Kurdari, in the Mat region, the debate over energy strategies translates into a far more immediate concern: whether there will be enough water for farmland and livestock. Lefter Sula, one of the residents opposing the construction of the “Doma” hydropower plant, explains how the ongoing confrontation with the company forces farmers to step away from their daily agricultural activities.

“I spent more than 30 years living abroad, but I chose to return to my village,” he recalled, describing how his family makes a living through farming and livestock breeding. “I have to leave my own work behind to go out and fight for my right to water,” Sula added. For him, the conflict has brought not only uncertainty about the future but also the loss of valuable working time.

Today, beside the road in Kurdari, an excavator that once entered the Lusa Stream to carry out construction work on the “Doma” hydropower plant remains as a reminder of one of the most intense confrontations between residents and the company seeking to exploit the area’s water resources. Two excavators were forcibly stopped by residents and, under pressure from the community, removed from the construction site and escorted towards the village road.

“We will sit here, we will lie down. You will have to drive over our bodies if you want to come and build it,” recalled Milazim Hystuna, the head of the village of Kurdari, describing the confrontation with the company. He explained that residents had asked the excavator operator to remove the machinery from the construction site.

“We did not damage the machine, because the machine itself is not to blame, nor did we use physical violence against anyone,” Hystuna explained.

On 6 March 2026, residents mobilised once again in the early hours of the morning after spotting a machine operating near the stream. It was yet another confrontation in a conflict that, for months, had forced residents to organise monitoring groups, leave their work in the fields and gather whenever they received reports of the company’s presence.

“As soon as they hear that the company has arrived, the residents come out, gather on their own and notify one another,” Hystuna explained. He said that residents had spent months on constant alert, monitoring movements near the stream through phone calls and messages exchanged among themselves.

Over time, residents expanded their opposition to several projects aimed at exploiting the Lusa Stream. In addition to “Doma”, two other hydropower plants, “Lusa 1” and “Lusa 2”, have also been proposed in the area by another company.

Following continued opposition, on 19 August 2025, the community organised what it called the “Assembly of Men”, a gathering that also included women, young people and emigrants who had returned to their hometown. Through this initiative, they sought to adopt a memorandum opposing the hydropower plants and use it in their legal battle, alongside a petition that, according to residents, collected 705 signatures.

“We gathered to defend our rights. We were all there, the entire village. That was a public hearing, because a public hearing is when the whole village is present,” Hystuna explained, challenging the way consultations on hydropower projects have been conducted.

Over a period of nearly one year, Kurdari residents organised at least seven public mobilisations and protests against the construction of the “Doma” hydropower plant. These took place from the Lusa Stream to the offices of the Municipality of Klos, the Administrative Court in Tirana and the Albanian Parliament. Meanwhile, repeated confrontations with company representatives also prompted police intervention.

On 4 July 2025, a dispute between residents and individuals linked to the construction company escalated into a physical confrontation. The following day, the Dibër Local Police Directorate announced that it had referred the case to the Prosecutor’s Office and initiated criminal proceedings against four residents suspected of “Intentional Minor Bodily Injury”, “Taking the Law into One’s Own Hands” and “Destruction of Property”. According to the police, they were suspected of damaging a company vehicle and assaulting a 39-year-old man involved in the investment. Residents, on the other hand, claimed they had been provoked and that the excavator operator had attempted to strike them with the machinery.

A 2017 study, conducted by the organisations EcoAlbania, Milieukontakt Albania and Lex Ferenda, identified 18 hydropower-related conflicts between 2012 and 2016, during which 34 people were arrested or taken in for police questioning, including six women and one minor. The study also documented one death resulting from a conflict over the construction of a hydropower plant, one injured person and one attempted murder.

For Halim Kadiu, a resident of Kurdari, the confrontations have brought not only financial expenses and legal proceedings but also fears that the dispute could escalate into personal hostility and violence.

“Why should we become enemies? They have already harmed us financially, and now they are going to harm us as human beings,” he said, calling on the authorities to intervene to prevent the conflict from escalating to the point where people take the law into their own hands.

In Kurdari, water holds a value that goes far beyond everyday use. The Lusa Stream, which flows down from the Balgjaj Lakes area, supplies an irrigation reservoir and agricultural land across several villages. According to Milazim Hystuna, the head of the village of Kurdari, the reservoir has a capacity of approximately 500,000 cubic metres and takes three to four months to fill.

The Suç Administrative Unit, part of the Municipality of Klos, comprises five villages: Kurdari, Skënderaj, Kurqelaj, Suç and Kujtim. According to the 2023 Population and Housing Census, the administrative unit has an officially recorded population of 1,770 residents.

Documents obtained by Media Amfora show that the “Doma” hydropower project has continued to advance through administrative procedures despite longstanding opposition from the local community. The contract for the construction of the hydropower plant, with an installed capacity of 1.695 megawatts, dates back to 27 December 2018. The project received a preliminary environmental impact assessment decision on 7 September 2023 and a water resource use permit on 26 December of the same year, valid until 26 December 2028. The construction permit is dated 23 January 2025.

The project developer is “Global Interprise Group”, a company established in January 2008 and managed by Ashim Doma. According to commercial registry records, its share capital is divided among Shefki Doma, who holds 34%, Ashim Doma with 33%, and Besmir Doma with 33%. The company has operated in several sectors, including trade, mining and construction, while the construction and operation of the “Doma” hydropower plant was added to its registered business activities on 15 May 2017. Ashim Doma is also listed as the administrator and sole shareholder of “Doma Group”, established in 2017. This company is linked to another hydropower project in the Mat region, the “Vinjolli 1” hydropower plant, with an installed capacity of 1.84 megawatts.

On 10 August 2026, the Energy Regulatory Authority (ERE) approved an electricity generation licence for “Global Interprise Group”, the developer of the “Doma” hydropower plant, through Decision No. 220. Meanwhile, residents’ resistance had also reached the courts. In 2025, they filed a lawsuit seeking to have decisions of the Klos Municipal Council, contracts for the use of public land, and administrative acts that enabled the construction of the hydropower plant declared invalid.

On 16 October of that year, the Administrative Court of First Instance in Tirana rejected their request for a temporary suspension of construction work, without reaching a final determination on the legality of the project. According to data provided to Amfora by the Administrative Court of Appeal and subsequently analysed by the newsroom, the case was still being processed.

However, while the legal dispute continued, the project underwent another institutional development. On 15 June 2026, ERE initiated the licensing procedure for “Global Interprise Group”. The regulator noted that no comments from third parties regarding the company’s licensing had been submitted by 25 June 2026, even though residents had long been opposing the project both publicly and through legal action.

Despite these developments, on 10 August 2026, the ERE Board adopted Decision No. 220, granting “Global Interprise Group” a 30-year licence to generate electricity from the “Doma” hydropower plant. The decision requires the company to commence operations by 23 January 2027.

To obtain the developer’s position, Media Amfora sent an official request for comment to “Global Interprise Group”, seeking its response to the issues raised. However, no reply had been received by the time this article was published.

Behind the project names that repeatedly appear in official documents are companies that have accumulated a significant number of hydropower plants across different parts of the country. According to Amfora’s analysis, the “Essegei/Balkan Green” group is linked to 22 hydropower plants, “Telemania-Alb” to 10, “Orenja Power” to 9, while “Shala Energy” and the “2T/Përxholla” group are each associated with 8. The timeline of these projects also shows that interest in exploiting water resources has persisted over the years, with projects documented across different periods.

The year 2010 recorded the highest number of first appearances in the analysed register, with 56 project names, while significant concentrations were also observed in 2017 with 44, 2018 with 40, 2022 with 43, and 2023 with 40.

The Battle to Irrigate Farmland

For farmers in Shtiqën and Nangë, in Kukës, the fears of Kurdari residents have become a reality. A shortage of irrigation water during the summer of 2026 prompted them to protest outside the Municipality of Kukës, accusing a hydropower plant operating in the village of restricting the release of water for irrigation.

“This situation also occurred in the previous two years, but this summer was extremely dry, so we decided to protest,” explained Arben Trota, a resident of the village of Shtiqën.

“Whenever I recorded and published videos denouncing the situation, the water would start flowing again,” he added, referring to the Shtiqën irrigation canal, which, according to residents, supplies water to approximately 820 hectares of agricultural land.

Following complaints from farmers in Kukës, Amfora reviewed a report from an inspection conducted by the National Agency of Natural Resources (AKBN) on 27–28 August 2026. According to the records examined, the “Pobreg” hydropower plant had generated electricity almost throughout the entire month of June and during several periods in July, including daytime hours. The Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy reminded the concessionaire, “Energy Plus”, of its obligation to ensure the water needed for irrigation, while the inspection also identified water losses caused by the condition of the irrigation canal.

“I used to grow potatoes and cabbage on about two dynym of land, but I haven’t cultivated it for the past two years because I cannot rely on having water. The first time, my crops failed because of the drought,” Trota concluded.

The conflict between electricity generation and communities’ water needs has also been documented by Albania’s Supreme State Audit Institution (KLSH). In its audit of the “Madhesh” and “Traja 1” hydropower plants in the Mat region, KLSH found that the projects had made no provision for irrigation water, despite documented requests submitted by residents. Another KLSH audit, completed in May 2025, concerning the “Sasaj” hydropower plant in southern Albania, documented failures to comply with obligations to maintain the ecological flow, causing damage to the ecosystem and difficulties in irrigating agricultural land. The facility’s environmental permit stipulated that during dry periods, depending on river flow levels, the amount of water required to remain in the natural riverbed could reach up to 100% of the available flow.

Conflicts over water use and electricity generation mainly arise in cases involving small-capacity hydropower plants. The “Doma” hydropower plant is designed with an installed capacity of 1.695 megawatts, while the “Jovići” project in Bosnia and Herzegovina has a capacity of just 0.6 megawatts. Nevertheless, these two relatively small investments have been at the centre of conflicts lasting for years.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Small Hydropower Plants Generated Just 2.41% of Electricity

According to data from the State Electricity Regulatory Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (DERK), small hydropower plants, with a combined installed capacity of 171.27 megawatts, generated 350.79 gigawatt-hours of electricity in 2025. This accounted for just 2.41% of the country’s total electricity generation. During the same period, solar power generation reached approximately 1,156 gigawatt-hours, more than three times the electricity produced by small hydropower plants.

On the other hand, Petar Đokić, Minister of Mining and Energy in the Government of Republika Srpska, considers small hydropower plants to be investments that contribute to economic development and job creation. According to him, the value of investments in small hydropower plants built in Republika Srpska has exceeded 270 million convertible marks (approximately 138 million euros). “We have paid for the electricity they generated and supplied it to households and businesses. That is a benefit, just as the investment itself is,” Đokić argued, emphasising both the direct and indirect effects on the economy.

“I believe we should never stand in the way of development. Development is what we strive for,” he concluded.

On the other side of the Balkans, in Albania, according to the annual reports of the Energy Regulatory Authority, new hydropower plants with a combined installed capacity of 31.42 megawatts began generating electricity between 2022 and 2024: 9.43 MW in 2022, 7.99 MW in 2023 and 14 MW in 2024. Meanwhile, according to INSTAT, private and concession-operated hydropower plants generated 3,109 gigawatt-hours of electricity in 2025, accounting for 41.6% of domestic electricity production. However, this category also includes large hydropower plants, meaning the figures cannot be directly compared to assess the contribution of small hydropower plants.

To understand the scale of this development, a study by Riverwatch and EuroNatur, updated in 2024, identified 3,188 planned hydropower plants, 94 under construction and 1,836 in operation across the Balkans. Approximately 92% of the planned projects had an installed capacity of less than 10 megawatts, while nearly half of the projects planned or under construction were located within existing or proposed protected areas.

For Ulrich Eichelmann, coordinator of the “Blue Heart of Europe” project and executive director of Riverwatch, the importance of the Balkan rivers extends far beyond the region’s borders.

“I would say that the rivers of the Balkans are of global importance. They are still in a natural state that we lost long ago in the rest of Europe. This means they are still alive, they can flow freely, and they are home to many birds and fish, an extraordinary wealth of wildlife,” he explained.

“That is why we call the rivers of the Balkans the ‘Blue Heart of Europe’. And it beats right here, in the Balkans!” Eichelmann emphasised, describing this natural heritage as still relatively unknown across Europe.

“While other European countries are working to restore rivers and remove dams, the trend of building hydropower plants continues in the Balkans,” environmental activist Besjana Guri explained, linking this phenomenon to the drive to exploit some of the region’s last relatively untouched rivers.

According to Guri, hydropower development should also be assessed in terms of the benefits it brings to the communities where the plants are built.

“Even when a hydropower plant is built within a community, it must translate into tangible services for that community, generate revenue for the municipality or local authority, or even provide electricity directly to the community,” Guri argued. She noted that such benefits are often promised but have not materialised in many of the cases she has followed during her work.

Economist Klodian Muço believes that concession policies should also be examined from a long-term perspective, as hydropower infrastructure depreciates over time and climate change may further limit electricity generation.

“Will we actually have anything left after 35 years from the date the permit was granted? In my opinion, once again, the answer is no, because depreciation is extremely high,” he said, referring to the costs associated with turbines and sediment accumulation in hydropower facilities.

As hydropower projects continue to be developed across Albania, the country’s rivers have lost a significant part of their natural character. Data from the Riverwatch and EuroNatur study show that, between 2018 and 2025 alone, the total length of river stretches classified as near-natural in Albania declined from 3,812 to 2,668 kilometres. Within seven years, the country lost 1,144 kilometres of river stretches in this category, a decrease of approximately 30%.

Meanwhile, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, opposition to small hydropower plants has also led to legislative changes. In July 2022, the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a ban on issuing new energy permits for hydropower plants with a capacity of up to 10 megawatts, subject to exceptions defined by law and transitional provisions for existing concessions. According to Riverwatch, the measure was expected to prevent at least 116 planned projects.

However, the ban does not apply throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The “Jovići” project on the Pliva River is located in Republika Srpska, where the dispute over the concession and environmental permits continues. Although the District Court in Banja Luka annulled three environmental permits for the project between 2025 and 2026, the investment had not been definitively abandoned.

Rivers “Flow” into the Court

For communities opposing hydropower plants, protests are often only the beginning of a much longer battle. In Albania, some of these disputes have ended up in court, where residents seek the annulment of environmental permits, construction permits, water use permits and concession contracts that enable the exploitation of rivers for hydropower generation.

Amfora analysed data provided by the Administrative Court of Appeal and identified 127 cases related to the hydropower sector, of which 73 were still being processed, 47 had been closed and seven were recorded as submitted. However, not all of these cases represent challenges brought by residents, as they also include commercial, tax and administrative disputes between companies and public institutions.

Of the total, Amfora identified at least 20 community-related court cases, involving seven distinct disputes. Six of these cases relate to the “Sekë” and “Zais” projects, five to “Dragobinë”, four to “Thirrë”, and two to “Seta”, while the remaining cases involve “Bushtricë”, “Shushicë” and “Doma” in Klos.

Çidhna: Over Seven Years in Court Over the “Seta 4” Hydropower Plant

Eleven residents of Çidhna, in the Dibër region, spent more than seven years fighting a legal battle to secure a ruling in their favour against the “Seta 4” hydropower plant, part of a complex of four hydropower facilities planned along the Seta Stream.

“We spent almost eight years in court. They have dried up the Seta River, and we had to fight to save the Sopanika Waterfall because they wanted to divert its water as well,” Mexhit Tola, a resident of the village of Çidhën, told Amfora.

Residents opposed the hydropower plant because of its impact on the natural monuments “Seta Gorge” and “Sopanika Spring and Cave”, seeking the annulment of the permits and administrative acts that authorised its construction.

“We agreed that the hydropower plant could be built under different conditions, with open channels allowing the water to evaporate, or with a reservoir that would fill with water so that the trout would not be harmed. But they did not do that. Instead, they diverted the river into pipes,” explained Qazim Daci, one of the plaintiffs.

The lawsuit was filed in July 2017 and dismissed by the Administrative Court of First Instance in December 2018. However, on 10 October 2024, the Administrative Court of Appeal overturned the ruling, partially annulling six administrative acts and concession-related decisions concerning “Seta 4” alone. In its reasoning, the court found, among other issues, that the water use permit had been approved by an authority lacking the legal competence to do so and that the environmental assessment had failed to adequately consider the protection of natural monuments. The legal battle subsequently reached the Supreme Court, where, as of August 2026, no date had yet been set for the hearing of the appeal.

The appeal before the Supreme Court concerns the ruling of the Administrative Court of Appeal, which decided in favour of the residents of Çidhna by partially annulling six acts that had enabled the construction of the “Seta 4” hydropower plant, including the construction permit, environmental approval, the relevant section of the concession agreement and water use permits.

“The pipes must be removed by the enforcement authorities. They are the ones who must issue the order. The case is now with the State Bailiff Service because the private bailiff refused to take it on due to pressure,” Qazim Daci explained.

“We’ll see. If the Dibër Bailiff Service gives up, then we will take matters into our own hands and forcibly remove the pipes,” Daci stated firmly.

The length of court proceedings reveals another cost of these disputes. In a group of 54 cases with valid date records, appeal proceedings lasted an average of 33.4 months, while the median duration was 20.9 months. In 14 of these cases, or approximately one in four, the proceedings lasted more than five years. For residents who depend on farming and livestock breeding for their livelihoods, such legal battles translate into years of uncertainty and financial expenses, while the projects may continue to advance through administrative procedures.

“There is no longer enough moisture for water to evaporate from the river, and the trees and plants have dried up. This used to be a place where wild trout with red spots lived, but they no longer exist there,” Mexhit Tola explained.

Meanwhile, the National Agency of Protected Areas confirmed to Amfora that the “Seta 1+2” and “Seta 3” hydropower plants, operated by “HYDRO SETA”, are located within the boundaries of the “Lurë–Mali i Dejës” National Park.

“Even though we won the court case, the company is still continuing its work,” explained another resident, Shukri Përgjegji.

Behind the Seta hydropower plants lies a business structure with substantial economic interests, against which residents have spent years fighting legal battles in court. According to commercial registry records, 74.5% of the share capital of the concessionaire company “HYDRO SETA” is owned by “ALB-BUILDING”, which is equally owned by Pëllumb Beta and Odhise Bresha, each holding a 50% stake. The remaining shares are distributed among “LIQENI VII” with 10.9%, “KUPA” with 8.6%, and “KALIA” and “2 L&M”, each holding 3%.

In 2024 alone, “HYDRO SETA” reported approximately 249 million Albanian lek in pre-tax profit (around €2.47 million), while its majority shareholder, “ALB-BUILDING”, was awarded 24 public tenders with a combined value of approximately 11.9 billion Albanian lek (around €118.2 million). The company did not respond to a request for comment before the publication of this article.

The length of this legal battle over a hydropower plant is not an isolated case. Among the 127 hydropower-related cases made available to Amfora by the Administrative Court of Appeal, 73 were still being processed as of September 2026. In a group of 54 cases with valid date records, the average duration of appeal proceedings reached 33.4 months (approximately 2 years and 9 months), while the median was 20.9 months (around 1 year and 9 months). In 14 cases, proceedings had lasted more than five years. These statistics also include disputes between companies and public institutions, but they illustrate the time burden of legal proceedings in a sector where decisions concerning the use of rivers can have long-term consequences.

Meanwhile, some hydropower plants remain within areas designated for special protection. In its official response dated 31 August 2026, the National Agency of Protected Areas (AKZM) identified four hydropower facilities or complexes located within protected areas: “Seta 1+2” and “Seta 3”, inside the “Lurë–Mali i Dejës” National Park, as well as “Dragobia” and “Dukagjini–Ndërlysa”, within the “Albanian Alps” National Park. However, the scale of this phenomenon has previously been documented as considerably more widespread.

According to earlier data obtained by Amfora, the National Agency of Protected Areas (AKZM) had previously identified 61 hydropower plants built or planned within protected areas, of which 34 had been constructed before 2015. The agency had identified only four cases of violations, while an audit by Albania’s Supreme State Audit Institution found five lease agreements for the use of public forest land for hydropower plant construction within protected areas, in violation of the relevant legislation.

As residents in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to travel between their villages and courtrooms hundreds of kilometres away, efforts to prevent the further shrinking of the “Blue Heart of Europe” face energy policies that still favour hydropower development through the construction of small dams. Protecting rivers also remains a test for both countries’ European Union integration processes.

In its 2025 report on Albania, the European Commission noted that water extraction from rivers and protected areas, without consultation with local communities and environmental organisations, had led to conflicts. Bosnia and Herzegovina was also assessed as having made no progress in the field of environment and climate change, with the Commission calling for improvements in environmental impact assessments, greater transparency in administrative procedures and stronger public participation in decision-making.

From the Pliva River in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Lusa Stream in Albania, residents continue to oppose hydropower projects that they believe threaten the water resources on which their communities depend.

“When we saw what was happening with the potential construction of the Jovići hydropower plant, we decided to get involved and try to stop it,” recalled Miloš Mitrić, one of the founders of the “Defenders of Pliva” group.

Meanwhile, in the Albanian village of Kurdari, Rexhep Kuleni sees this struggle as a responsibility towards future generations.

“A schoolchild once asked me: ‘Grandpa, where are you going? To the protest? Is Doma [the hydropower plant] taking our water away?’ We have a responsibility to those children, to the generations yet to come, because if we make a mistake today, tomorrow it will be too late,” Kuleni concluded, his brow furrowed and his gaze reflecting his determination to continue this struggle to the very end.

“This article was produced with the support of Journalismfund Europe.” The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of Journalismfund Europe.

Journalists: Geri Emiri and Dejan Rakita. This cross-border investigation was published in Albania by ©Amfora.al and in Bosnia and Herzegovina by ©Objavi.ba.

The post The Battle for the Blue Heart of Europe: Communities Refuse to Surrender Their Rivers first appeared on Amfora.

During the panel dedicated to digital platforms, they discussed the difficulties small media outlets face in reaching readers while striving to maintain journalistic standards. Fewer and fewer people visit news organisations’ websites directly to read news. Instead, many get their information from posts appearing on social media, such as Facebook and similar platforms.

This means that newsrooms decide which stories to publish, but how those stories are distributed to users depends largely on the platforms’ algorithms.

“Today, we face algorithms and a feed of posts that changes every day, every week or every month, and we have to keep up with these changes. But for non-profit and alternative media outlets, what matters is remembering that we are not influencers or entertainment pages, and of course we need to follow our audience, but we must not change who we are,” said Geri Emiri, Head of Media Amfora.

According to Emiri, media outlets need to adapt how they present news to audiences using social media without abandoning fact-checking and investigative reporting. This requires more work from small newsrooms, which must produce not only articles but also short videos, audio content and infographics.

Emiri also shared Amfora’s experience in independent journalism, innovation and digital adaptation, highlighting the support provided through the “Sustain Media” programme, implemented by GIZ and co-financed by the European Union and the German Federal Government.

He also presented the “Resilience Observatory”, an initiative of the Amfora Center focused on monitoring disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference. The initiative is developed with the support of the EU Delegation to Albania, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Embassy of Poland.

A similar experience was shared by Marko Miletić, a representative of the Serbian media outlet Mašina, who explained that his newsroom had changed how it presents news to adapt to different platforms.

“We are the editors of our own content, but we try to adapt and present it in different ways for different audiences on social media. We are responsible for what we publish, but the problem is that we do not control the platforms ourselves,” Miletić said.

He cited the coverage of protests in Serbia as an example, explaining that TikTok’s restrictions on violent footage led the newsroom to refrain from publishing certain videos on the platform to avoid the risk of having its account shut down. The same footage was published on other platforms.

These difficulties are even greater for media outlets in smaller countries, which struggle to communicate directly with the companies that operate social media platforms.

Filip Stojanovski of the Metamorphosis Foundation in North Macedonia emphasised that these companies make decisions based on profit and market size. According to him, aligning the legislation of countries in the region with that of the European Union could help ensure that platforms are held more accountable for how they operate.

The discussion also raised concerns that content provoking strong reactions spreads more easily on social media, while articles that fact-check inaccurate information do not necessarily receive the same attention.

Despite these difficulties, participants stressed that efforts to reach more readers must not compromise the accuracy of reporting. Miletić explained that during the student protests in Serbia, the Mašina newsroom had decided not to publish unconfirmed names, despite pressure to make them public.

This example was used to emphasise that, regardless of the speed at which news spreads on social media, responsibility for verifying information remains with journalists.

The post Algorithms change how news is distributed, posing a challenge for independent media first appeared on Amfora.

On 18 October, the X account of Sarrah Bellus, which has 62,600 followers, linked the fire to a claim that the Supreme Court had allowed Jared Kushner to purchase land in Albania against the wishes of its citizens.

Although the post did not identify any court ruling, it received around two million views and 24,000 reposts.

A day later, “The Patriotic Blonde” portrayed the confrontation as opposition to Kushner’s project and claimed that citizens were facing military forces backed by Israel.

The latter was a narrative that also spread widely through channels in Albania, targeting the Armed Forces, NATO, Israel and the United States to create the false impression that they were influencing the protests and that the military could also become involved.

On the other hand, the existence of opposition to Jared Kushner’s projects and the spontaneous youth protests does not prove that the fire in premises used for commercial activity, although located within the court building, was caused by a ruling in Kushner’s favour.

However, in the posts examined, which primarily targeted international audiences, this connection was presented as an explanation for the incident, without supporting documentation.

From a Fire in Part of the Building to Claims of Its Complete Destruction

On 18 October, the account “Blade of the Sun” claimed that the Supreme Court was burning in its entirety, that the Prime Minister was in hiding and that the country was in the hands of rebels. X displayed around 4.6 million views for this post.

It is an account with a large audience and political content critical of economic and political elites. Meanwhile, other accounts positioned as anti-Trump used the incident to target the US president’s family.

A similar description was used on 19 October by Dr Sam Youssef, who has 770,000 followers on X, portraying the institution as having been completely burnt down and linking the protests to corruption and Kushner’s interests.

Reports from the scene described a more limited incident. According to Albanian media, the fire started on business premises and spread to offices on the ground floor of the Supreme Court.

Firefighters intervened to extinguish the flames in the commercial premises inside the court building, next to Myslym Shyri Street.

Nevertheless, the consequences for the institution were tangible, as the flames spread extensively across the ground floor. On 20 October, the Supreme Court explained in an announcement that court case files had also been damaged. Hearings, except for urgent cases, would be postponed while the damage was assessed and working conditions were restored.

The Court Was Portrayed as Supporting the Prime Minister, While Criticism Extended to SPAK

Another interpretation, published on 20 October by “Muslim Mirror”, claimed that protesters had set fire to the Supreme Court because it supported the Prime Minister. The post did not mention any specific ruling or provide evidence for the motive it attributed to the attack.

The claim also emerged in political debate outside Albania, as Indian politician Sanjay Raut, who has 1.3 million followers, used footage of the incident to claim that the court was helping corrupt prime ministers and to issue a warning concerning India.

According to NDTV, the post prompted accusations from his opponents that he was threatening constitutional institutions. Raut later stated that he had confidence in the Supreme Court.

The case shows that footage from Tirana was also used in debates about trust in the judiciary within a different political context.

In the Albanian-speaking sphere, attention was not limited to the damaged buildings. On 14 October, the Instagram account “Albanian History” published a text entitled “SPAK, the Failure of Albanian Justice!”.

The post acknowledged that investigations had been conducted and significant sentences handed down, but argued that systemic corruption persisted. It raised concerns about political and foreign influence, called for an independent assessment of SPAK’s results and demanded accountability from prosecutors’ offices and courts.

The text called for protests, an independent judiciary and the lawful removal of leaders who had failed.

In a different development, Pravda Shqipëri, part of the pro-Russian ecosystem, republished material on 19 October citing the Telegram channel “balkanar” as its source.

The article incorporated the damage to the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court into a narrative of escalation towards revolution, using descriptions of authoritarian governance.

The material treated the judiciary as part of the broader political crisis, without providing specific evidence concerning the motives behind the attacks on it.

The fire-related incidents during the protests affected several institutions. On 14 October, attacks on the Constitutional Court and a fire at the Ministry of Justice were reported.

Following the fire at the Supreme Court on 17 October, A2 reported on 19 October that several protesters had entered the Court of Appeal, broken windows and started a fire at the entrance.

On 20 October, according to a statement reported by the media, the National Association of Judges called for better protection of courts and their staff.

The association also objected to the Prime Minister’s language towards judges reviewing security measures imposed on protesters, warning of the risk of pressure on judicial decision-making.

The actual damage to judicial institutions was intertwined with accusations of support for the government, political control and foreign interests, amid a wave of disinformation posts primarily targeting international audiences.

The post Attacks on Courts Accompanied by Claims of Political Control and Foreign Interests first appeared on Amfora.

“An American warship arrived today in the waters near Orikum, in the Bay of Vlorë,” read the caption accompanying the video.

The post mentioned a military helicopter at the rear of the ship and stated that the reason for its presence was unclear. The claim was repeated in English by the account “Kruja Chronicles” on the social media platform X, without any additional information identifying the vessel.

The presence of the ships was genuine, but claims that they were American and linked to the protests were unsupported by evidence and proved to be false. The Ministry of Defence’s response to Amfora, together with documentation of the activities at Pashaliman, confirmed that a NATO exercise had taken place.

In its written response, the ministry confirmed that the “NEPTUNE STRIKE 26-4” exercise had taken place in the Bay of Vlorë from 17 to 19 October.

“No American ship took part,” the Ministry of Defence told Amfora.

According to the ministry, the vessels present were Turkish and the activity had been planned in advance. The ministry also confirmed the use of two unmanned aerial vehicles in the exercise area beyond the Karaburun Peninsula.

Meanwhile, Turkish participation in the exercise had been made public before the activities in Vlorë. In an announcement dated 15 October, Türkiye’s Ministry of National Defence had announced the deployment of TCG Anadolu, the frigate TCG Gaziantep and the submarine TCG Gür for the NATO exercise in several maritime areas, including the Adriatic and Ionian seas.

On 19 October, Anadolu Agency documented TCG Anadolu’s participation in the exercise at the Pashaliman Naval Base. Demonstrations involving helicopters and Bayraktar TB3 drones took place during the activity.

Other posts, however, went beyond claims about the vessel’s nationality. The X account known as Dunav Intel mentionedits resemblance to TCG Anadolu, a possible Bayraktar drone flight and previous claims concerning American and Israeli interests on Sazan Island.

The post brought these elements together in a single narrative but provided no evidence of an operational connection between them.

Narratives Also Targeted the Military and the New US Ambassador

Claims about the ships in Vlorë emerged in a context in which movements of vehicles described as military in Tirana had also been interpreted as preparations for intervention against protesters.

On 15 October, Amfora fact-checked reports published by Syri.net and Lajmifundit.al, which presented footage of trucks as evidence that the military was being deployed against students.

These claims also circulated beyond Albanian media outlets, using footage that did not show vehicles or uniforms belonging to the Albanian Armed Forces.

On Instagram, Al Arabiya published footage of another convoy of vehicles, describing it in Arabic as the beginning of the deployment of the Armed Forces on the streets of Tirana, amid escalating protests and clashes with police.

The account powerfulcountries went further, claiming that Prime Minister Edi Rama had ordered the deployment of heavily armed, militarised tactical units to contain protesters.

The post also linked public dissatisfaction to the project of Jared Kushner, the US president’s son-in-law, presenting the approval of the resort as one of the criticisms directed at the government.

Meanwhile, trendingalb reported that circulating videos appeared to show military personnel in central Tirana. The account also mentioned claims about American helicopters near Berat, but explicitly described them as unverified. Thus, the same post brought together protest footage, an alleged military presence and suspicions about American aircraft, without confirming any connection between them.

The reports also appeared in Turkish media. In an article published in English on 19 October, Haberler placed the convoy footage in the context of the protests in Albania.

However, the article clarified that there was no official confirmation linking the convoy to the protests and that there was no verified information about soldiers intervening against demonstrators or the military being tasked with suppressing the protests.

The footage also circulated in Russian. In a video posted by the account “SPART NEWS”, the convoy of trucks was accompanied by the caption: “Tirana in flames: Military convoys enter the capital, Rama clings to power.” The visible description added that Tirana had turned into a “battlefield” overnight.

Meanwhile, claims about the presence of an American ship near Vlorë also circulated on foreign accounts.

According to preliminary monitoring by Amfora Centre’s “Resilience Observatory”, the account DD Geopolitics shared material about the military presence in the area, as part of posts linking it to the protests.

Material on the same topic was also published by Srbin.info, extending the discussion to Serbian-speaking audiences.

In a parallel narrative, Albania News-Pravda shifted attention to the Trump family’s economic interests in Albania by republishing an article from PolitNavigator entitled “How Trump’s Son-in-Law Became the Detonator of the Albanian Revolution”.

The website portrayed Jared Kushner’s project as a symbol of foreign elites benefiting while young Albanians faced economic hardship.

News-Pravda is part of the “Pravda” ecosystem of websites, documented by the French agency VIGINUM in its “Portal Kombat” investigation as a network spreading pro-Russian content. The VIGINUM report describes the expansion of this ecosystem towards audiences in different countries.

Regarding Srbin.info, a study published in 2020 by NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence documented the frequent republication of Sputnik Srbija content and a predominantly pro-Russian editorial orientation.

DD Geopolitics, meanwhile, was described in an Intel Focus analysis published in September 2026 as a network of accounts spreading pro-Russian propaganda.

The narrative surrounding the ships developed alongside claims about the role of the US ambassador and the possible use of the military during the protests.

On 16 October, US Ambassador Eric Wendt met with the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Arben Kingji.

Newsbomb cited unidentified sources regarding an alleged message from the ambassador concerning the use of the military.

The public announcement of the meeting, reproduced in the same article, referred to defence cooperation, capability modernisation, and national and collective security, without mentioning any instructions concerning troop deployment.

An article published by “Tempull News” also raised the question of whether the meeting was linked to an alleged message concerning military readiness, although the outlet acknowledged that it had no independent confirmation of the existence, content or reason for the alleged order.

On social media, the claim took a more categorical form.

A post by “diaspora.news.shqip” claimed that the ambassador had ordered the Albanian military not to intervene during the protests and referred to several photographs of messages from a WhatsApp conversation.

The actual presence of the ships, footage of vehicle convoys and the US ambassador’s meeting with the head of the military were thus woven into narratives about intervention during the protests, despite the absence of evidence linking these developments. These narratives spread widely both within Albania and abroad at the height of the wave of protests.

The post NATO Exercise and Military Movements Portrayed as Intervention During Protests first appeared on Amfora.

Chanting “KLA” and slogans against Volodymyr Zelenskyy, they proceeded as far as the vicinity of the former Russian Embassy in Tirana, where they symbolically placed the words “Free Dardania” over the street sign bearing its recently adopted name, “Free Ukraine.” The reaction came one day after the Ukrainian president stated in Belgrade that Ukraine’s position of non-recognition of Kosovo remained unchanged.

“Our position of non-recognition of Kosovo remains unchanged,” was the exact wording Zelenskyy used on August 8 during a press conference in Belgrade. During the same public appearance, he thanked Serbia for respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including Crimea, and did not go into detail about Serbia’s claims over Kosovo.

The statement reached Kosovo alongside institutional reactions. On August 9, the Municipality of Prishtina removed from a building near Zahir Pajaziti Square a banner featuring the Ukrainian flag and the words “Free Ukraine,” which had been installed following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Mayor Përparim Rama posted a video that received more than 400,000 views on Facebook and linked the decision to the failure to respect Kosovo’s statehood, while stressing that empathy and solidarity with peoples facing war and persecution continued.

These developments were framed through pro-Serbian and pro-Russian narratives by several media outlets and public figures, creating the impression that Albanians’ pro-Ukraine position had changed while denying the legitimate existence of the state of Kosovo.

From Local Reactions to Russian State Amplification

Zelenskyy’s statement, followed by the decision to remove the banner in the heart of Prishtina, fuelled a network of social media accounts linked to Russian and Serbian state propaganda, as well as broader forms of nationalism directed particularly against Kosovo and against Albanians in general.

The Russian outlet Sputnik Srbija, which covers developments and events in Serbia, reported the banner’s removal on Telegram, using the wording “the so-called Kosovo” and linking the decision to Zelenskyy’s visit to Belgrade. However, it omitted the part of Prishtina Mayor Përparim Rama’s statement in which he said that empathy and solidarity with peoples facing war and persecution continued. From the wider reaction, it selected only the action that could be interpreted as a withdrawal of support for Ukraine.

Only 27 minutes later, the Balkan section of Russia Today published an almost identical paragraph, with the same sequence of information and the same designation, “the so-called Kosovo.” It similarly presented the story without placing Përparim Rama’s statement in context.

An analysis of posts by media outlets and accounts operating mainly on X shows that the story was distorted through three successive shifts: Vučić’s political paraphrase was turned into a quotation that Zelenskyy had never uttered; the Municipality of Prishtina’s decision and the reaction of a group of protesters in Tirana were generalised as the position of Albanians as a whole; and disappointment with Kyiv was used to promote the idea of Albanians drawing closer to Russia.

Alongside the messages disseminated by Russian channels, similar messages were also circulated by Serbian accounts, which now focused on events in the Albanian capital. A video was shared showing a group of protesters from the civic movement, which had been continuing for 77 days, passing in front of the Ukrainian Embassy in Tirana. The protesters, visibly angered, chanted against Zelenskyy, but said nothing about Ukraine itself or about support for Russia in particular.

Profiles on X, such as that of Vladimir Stevanović, reposted the video while adding misleading elements and framing it in a way that suited a pro-Russian narrative—as though Albanians were turning against Ukraine and in favour of Putin.

“Albanians from Albania and Kosovo are shouting in front of the Ukrainian Embassy in Tirana: ‘Zelensky, Zelensky, … [offensive words quoted in English],’ while chants in support of Russia and Putin can also be heard,” he wrote, although no such chants could be heard in the videos shared by protesters.

Even the statement by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, which supported both Ukraine and Kosovo while calling for normalisation and mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia, became the target of ethnonationalist and stigmatising language. Some posts labelled Albanians “separatists” and “drug and organ traffickers,” without providing evidence, while describing Kosovo as “occupied territory.” Marinko Učur, presented as a journalist based in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “translated” the statement through a response directed against the very existence of the state of Kosovo.

“Albanians are still dreaming wet separatist dreams! Do they really think that, even in their madness, anyone would ever recognise the occupation of 14% of their territory in order to enable the creation of another Albanian state in the Balkans?” he wrote above the post by the Albanian Foreign Ministry.

“Serbia does not need any recognition from Albanian separatists and drug and organ traffickers. It will not happen! UN Resolution 1244 is still in force!” concluded Marinko Učur, a journalist from Banja Luka and commentator on political affairs in Republika Srpska, who is known for his pronounced Serbian nationalist perspective.

The Narrative of Disappointment with Ukraine Was Converted into Support for Russia

Criticism of Kyiv began as a reaction to its non-recognition of Kosovo, but within part of the Albanian-speaking information space it gradually changed direction. The debate shifted from demands for reciprocity from Ukraine to the claim that Albanians should reconsider their position on the war and draw closer to Russia. In this way, Kosovo’s diplomatic position was used to question support for Ukraine and to normalise pro-Russian messages.

“Let’s go Russia, a little harder,” read the caption of a video published by the profile “MATEAN” on TikTok on August 8. The video displayed the texts: “The clown Zelensky visits Serbia, Russia’s greatest ally. The clown reconfirmed that Ukraine supports the genocidal state of Serbia against Kosovo’s independence,” and “Meanwhile, Kosovo is one of Ukraine’s biggest supporters in the world.”

At the time of monitoring, the video had reached almost 210,000 views, 7,089 likes, 843 comments and 953 shares. The profile had around 25,000 followers and 3.3 million cumulative likes across its content. Among the comments receiving high engagement were accounts writing “Now I support Russia” and “Free Russia,” as well as calls to remove Ukrainian flags and expel Ukrainian citizens.

One day later, a similar narrative appeared in an even more direct form within the Albanian-speaking space on X, while targeting an international audience through English-language descriptions. The profile called “Kruja Chronicles” wrotethat Albanians should “switch sides and fight for Russia.”

The comment was accompanied by the resharing of a photograph published on March 10, 2026, showing several armed individuals in military uniforms holding the Albanian flag. The photograph was presented with the description: “Photo of individuals from Albania who are reportedly serving in Ukraine’s Territorial Defence Forces.”

Continuing this narrative, another post drew a parallel between Kosovo and the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia in Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. It argued that because the West had supported Kosovo’s right to self-determination, the same principle should be applied to the Russian population in these regions. According to this reasoning, residents who identify as Russian and do not want to be governed by Ukraine should have the right to self-government or unification with Russia, while the opposing position was presented as the use of double standards.

After this year’s Orthodox Easter, Alexander Dugin shared a post by the same profile showing the Orthodox community at the Resurrection of Christ Cathedral in Tirana. Dugin added the description: “Albania was once a Christian country. Modern Albania was founded by the Orthodox priest Fan Noli.”

He is known as an ideologue of modern anti-Albanianism and represents the ideological wing of Russian imperialism-an ultranationalist, anti-liberal and expansionist project that views Russia as the centre of a Eurasian empire and denies the full sovereignty of countries Moscow considers part of its sphere of influence.

The thrust of the posts on social media, particularly on X, rested on equating Kosovo, an already independent state, with the Ukrainian regions of Donbas and Crimea. But this analogy disregards their different contexts: Kosovo went through war, NATO intervention and international administration, whereas Crimea and parts of Donbas are internationally recognised as parts of Ukraine that have been occupied or annexed by Russia. Zelenskyy’s statement was therefore used to construct a false equivalence and turn Ukraine’s non-recognition of Kosovo into an argument in support of Russian aggression.

Vučić’s Phrase Attributed to Zelenskyy

One of the principal distortions of Zelenskyy’s statement occurred when his wording about Ukraine’s unchanged position of non-recognition of Kosovo was replaced with the sentence “Kosovo is Serbia.” The difference is not merely linguistic: the Ukrainian president reaffirmed Kyiv’s longstanding policy, while the second formulation directly asserts Serbia’s position on Kosovo’s status, rather than Ukraine’s.

The phrase was used on August 9 by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, who, while commenting on the reactions in Prishtina, said that Zelenskyy had come to Belgrade and, according to his interpretation, had said, “Yes, Kosovo is Serbia.” Although those words do not appear in the Ukrainian president’s statement, they were Vučić’s political paraphrase of Kyiv’s position.

One of the media outlets that detached this paraphrase from Vučić and attributed it to Zelenskyy was Borba.me, which is based in Montenegro and publishes markedly pro-Serbian and pro-Russian content. In its report on disinformation in Montenegro during 2024, the regional fact-checking network SEE Check listed it among the main websites spreading pro-Russian and anti-European Union narratives.

On August 9, the online outlet used a headline claiming that Albanians in Kosovo had removed the Ukrainian flag after Zelenskyy “said that Kosovo is Serbia.” Vučić’s paraphrase was thus presented in the headline as a statement by the Ukrainian president, even though the article itself did not support that attribution.

In Serbia, the pro-government outlet Informer TV posted Vučić’s video on TikTok and presented “Zelenskyy’s message that Kosovo is Serbia” as an excellent outcome of his visit to Belgrade. The video received at least 1,637 likes, 269 comments and 225 shares. Meanwhile, the Serbian organisation CRTA has listed Informer among the media outlets that frequently publish manipulative news. The reach of these posts centred on the interpretation used by Vučić, which was then presented as a direct quotation from Zelenskyy.

Profiles such as that of Mladen Mrdalj, who describes himself as holding a PhD in political science and working as a part-time lecturer at Webster University in the United States, offered a controversial perspective following Zelenskyy’s statement. He promoted the view that Kosovo should no longer receive Western support because Putin uses it as a “card” to justify his expansionist plans, although his posts partly align with arguments exploited by the Kremlin.

“The moral foundation of Western support for Ukraine would be much stronger if the West followed Ukrainian support for Serbian territorial integrity by ending support for the Kosovo Albanian secessionist parastate that Putin consistently invokes to justify his aggression,” he wrote on X.

What began as disappointment with a diplomatic position held by Kyiv was thus transformed in the digital sphere through distorted quotations, the generalisation of isolated reactions and content that adapted local events to pro-Serbian and pro-Russian narratives. Reactions in Prishtina and Tirana were interpreted as the collective position of Albanians, while criticism of Ukraine was used to normalise messages in favour of Russia.

The post From “Kosovo Is Serbia” to “Fight for Russia”: How Zelenskyy’s Statement Was Distorted on Social Media first appeared on Amfora.

Ambassador Gonzato’s statement further underlined that: “The EU will continue to raise these concerns and support reforms that create a safer and fairer environment for journalists. At the same time, we will continue to invest in independent journalism, fact-checking initiatives, and media education because informed citizens are the best defence against disinformation and manipulation,” concluded Ambassador Gonzato.

The organizers highlighted the growing interest and professional standards in investigative journalism, reflecting the continued commitment of journalists to protecting transparency and the right to information.

“This year we had not only the highest number of applications but also the highest quality and most diverse topics, addressing misuse of public funds, corruption, and issues surrounding ecology, health, and cultural heritage,” said Sanja Lazic, representative of ‘Thomson Media’, in her opening remarks at the ceremony.

The ceremony carried on with the jury’s presentation, which selected this year’s winners from 32 applications, with members Blerjana Bino, Fatjona Mejdini, and Rashela Shehu, who presented the winners of the awards for the best investigative stories of 2024, divided into three awards. The first prize was won by journalists Geri Emiri and Erjola Azizolli from the media Amfora.al for the article “Resort at the Bay of Manastir destroyed the archaeological potential of Butrint Park”.

The Amfora investigation revealed the destruction of archaeological heritage in coastal areas for profit purposes, documenting how construction companies benefited from the government-granted status of so-called “Strategic Investor” despite clear violations of UNESCO rules and regulations. The article raises serious questions about accountability, corruption, and the protection of cultural assets on Albania’s path towards European integration.

The second prize this year had two winners, which went to journalists Vladimir Karaj and Edmond Hoxhaj from the media outlet “Reporter.al”. Karaj’s article – “Like in prison: African workers face deprivation of liberty and exploitation in Albania” – brings shocking evidence of the exploitation of African workers through discriminatory and illegal practices, documenting serious human rights violations. Meanwhile, journalist Hoxhaj’s research – “KPK asked for donation from Kastrati’s company, reminding him of a previously won tender” – exposes the lack of transparency in a key institution of justice reform, raising questions about institutional integrity and ethics in seeking public funds.

In third place were journalists Erisa Kryeziu and Esmeralda Keta from the media outlet “Citizens.al” with the article “They exploit us to the core: Women in the manufacturing industry complain about working conditions”. Their well-documented investigation addresses the exploitation of women in garment factories, shedding light on an important social and economic problem that often remains in the shadows.

In last year’s awards, “Third Place” went to journalists Geri Emiri, Aida Ciro, and Aleksandar Dimitrievski from Amfora.al for their article that exposed the challenges faced by farmers in the Balkans in accessing EU funds through the IPARD Programme.

The European Union Investigative Journalism Awards are presented by the European Union in cooperation with Thomson Media in the Western Balkan countries and in Turkey, with the aim of strengthening and supporting independent and investigative journalism.

The post European Union awards first prize to Amfora’s investigation into the destruction of Butrint Park first appeared on Amfora.

These Hollywood scenes from 1983 continue to inspire, so much so that the “king of gambling in Albania”, Ervis Martinaj, allegedly built a similar palace, which he baptized as “Arbëria Palace” and under the bright neon, “The World Is Yours”, decided to pose his lion that had just started walking.

Baptized as “King Simba” and with the suffix “007”, which seemed to represent Martinaj, he first appeared on TikTok on December 21, 2021. The audience of the cub, who is thought to have arrived there at 3 months old, grew week after week, seeing him from the first days with a bottle of milk, to the poses in the luxurious surroundings of the “Arbëria Palace” Hotel, in Fushë-Milot.

“Simba is now quite big, about 1 meter tall,” said one of the waiters at the hotel bar with a smile. His account has stopped posting since Martinaj himself disappeared under still unclear circumstances, leaving behind scenarios similar to the end of the character he wanted to resemble, Tony Montana.

The lion is now grown and unsuitable for the hotel’s customers, who were once curious to see him. Arbëria Palace executives declined to comment on its whereabouts. But it seems that Martinaj turned keeping a lion into a symbol of power – for organized crime bosses, who were also involved at the highest levels.

After the success of 2017, when the international organization “Four Paws”, in cooperation with the authorities, intervened to confiscate and then send abroad 3 lions that were kept in scandalous conditions in the private park, “Safari Park Zoo” in Fier, crime bosses and the children of millionaires turned the situation upside down by importing dozens of cubs.

“If previously these animals were reported to be kept in cages in business premises, bars or hotels, there have been an increase in cases where they are also kept by individuals as companion animals. Their sale is openly ‘online’ and in stores, without any control,” commented the situation through an official statement, the organization “Animal Rescue Albania”.

Through a regional investigation, Amfora discovered that lion cubs have been appearing in recent years in countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia – raising suspicions of an organized criminal network in their breeding, transport and sale.

During field checks in several countries, where undercover methods were also used to collect evidence, Amfora documented that at least in Albania and Kosovo, a lion cub can be easily ordered through “pet shops”, while evidence points to a large regional market, outside the control of the authorities.

“If you contact [pet shops], the first thing they say is, oh lions and tigers are easy for me. It’s difficult for me if you ask me for a dinosaur”, explained veterinarian Ariel Vasili.

In Albania, more and more lion cubs are being bought as pets, replacing the pets of crime bosses, children of businessmen and politicians, spread throughout the country, but mainly in the central and northern regions.

“It is thought that there are about 80 or 90 big cats, that is, lions and tigers in Albania,” analyzed veterinarian Ariel Vasili, for the calculations that have been made through the research work of experts and animal protection organizations. The numbers increased only after “lion cubs” became the new symbol of criminal power in recent years.

“If we make a comparison by the number of inhabitants, it is very close to the number of big cats kept in South Africa, which is the first country in the world,” explained Sajmir Shehu, from the international organization “Four Paws”.

“This is related to the mentality of these types of people. They usually think that I cannot keep a dog as a pet because I am not at the same level as my neighbor,” he added.

They are trafficked as puppies and manage to survive through feeding them baby-like milk, inappropriate treatment, and the way they are kept which later creates health problems.

“They were both malnourished,” said Sonja Mandić, director of the Palić Zoo in the city of Subotica in Serbia, of the two lion cubs that the police brought to her. “They were not fed the right kind of food or supplements, they were fed formula milk for human babies,” she added.

Lions and Tigers – The Latest Fashion of Organized Crime

15 minutes away from the now-fallen empire of Ervis Martinaj, another empire has been set up on a picturesque peninsula in the Patok Lagoon. “Royal Blue” is a luxury restaurant owned by the family of the self-proclaimed “drug lord”, Gëzim Çela.

On November 28, 2023, a baby lion was the special guest of Albania’s independence celebration, pouring glasses of wine, next to a traditional table, behind which 4 waiters in traditional clothing lined up to serve him. That shows a video on Instagram. 

“He’s 8 months old now, he’s grown up a lot for a visit,” one of the restaurant employees said slowly, when we asked to see the lion, adding, “It’s too dangerous for you.”

A little further on, “Are you looking for the lion?” a boy behind the counter asked eagerly. “I have one here,” the boy added, taking his cell phone out of his pocket and showing photos of the exotic animal.

We soon learned that his name was “Tajson” and that he was fed fresh meat every day. Gëzim Çela lived for several years on the run and gave in to his criminal imagination, hiring the chief of the Kurbin Police, Dritan Metaj, as his “driver.” Çela, once a police officer himself – was arrested in Kosovo and after extradition is accused of being the head of a structured criminal group for drug trafficking.

However, Tyson is said to have been brought into the family by his son. The owners of the “Royal Blue” restaurant, where the lion had appeared several times, refused to comment on him.

Activists say that keeping these animals by criminal families also makes it difficult to identify their owner, in case of a denunciation to the authorities. Gëzim Çela managed to change the ownership of the restaurant before his arrest, while other drug lords have changed their names and are not the owners of real estate.

“I have no way of knowing who the person is, I only have a video and it is removed the moment the case becomes public,” explained Oli Pero of similar cases, who runs the “Animals Need Me” organization, focused on Shkodra.

Organized crime in the region, although it worships the figure of the lion through quoting quotes and postings with its icon (“emoy”), seems less courageous to go to these levels.

Experts indicate that this approach was also developed after the relocation of Albanian organized crime exponents to Dubai, where, although it is illegal, the criminal elites of the Middle East who keep tigers and lions began to be inspired by the image.

“About 70% are lions and 30% are tigers”, analyzed expert Sajmir Shehu.

“They think that lions are a little calmer, not as aggressive as tigers and they have information about people who usually have tigers and then change them into lions because tigers are very aggressive”, confessed Shehu. “I don’t know what they expected?!”, he followed with rhetorical questions.

Moving even further north in Albania – “King Didi” was another surprise when he appeared in a narrow alley, the pillars of which were overloaded with security cameras. Next to a luxury Mercedes Benz “G” class, he walked like a wandering pedestrian, apparently the newest resident of the neighborhood.

We calculated his audience and he is the most famous Albanian lion on “TikTok”, where one of the videos has received 7.2 million views. Among the comments from the audience, prayers stand out with the message that when he grows up and can no longer be kept, to notify the organization “Four Paws”.

But the arrogance of the account manager on “TikTok” is followed by comments that he eats 2 kg of meat a day.

“It is illegal to own a wild animal. It should be free in its original habitat and not as a pet, in a house,” commented a social media user in English.

Anisa Kostani comes to the side of the account owner – who asks the commenter to speak Albanian – by showing that she knows the law well and not to deal with lions, but with dogs on chains.

“Ahaa, I am a police officer, you show me the law,” she replies to the commenter who points out that it is illegal to keep a lion.

The officer works in the economic crime sector of the Elbasan Police Department – another city bloodied by clashes between criminal gangs. Passionate about snakes, which she exposes on her social networks, she is not an isolated case. Amfora also identified other police officers who were exposed with young lions.

The Lion in Shkodra is suspected of being based in one of the bases of the Bajri crime family, in what is known as the Dobraç Neighborhood. Like the hashtags accompanying the lion’s videos – Belgium and Brussels – the group is known for being extremely violent in its activity.

criminal act there, which he has also transferred to Shkodra, facing in recent years the Special Prosecution.

In the last 10 years, the State Police has investigated people who have caught or kept animals illegally, but it seems that they have not yet reached the depths of crime, where lions and tigers hide.

“For the criminal offense ‘Damage to protected species of wild flora and fauna’, according to article 202 of the Criminal Code, for the period 01.08.2014 – 01.08.2024, 15 cases have been identified, with 19 perpetrators prosecuted, 3 of them arrested in flagrante delicto, 15 prosecuted while at large and 1 declared wanted”, the police officially explained.

In one year, Oli Pero and the activists have filed 22 criminal reports in several cities for animal abuse. “However, these criminal charges have not borne fruit as we might have hoped at first because the criminal codes for animals are numerous,” the young woman said.

Amfora learned that she and other experts in Albania have faced pressure and physical attacks after following up on various cases of illegal animal keeping. Meanwhile, in North Macedonia, one of the experts and activists who identified the keeping of a lion was threatened with her life.

“It was a truly terrifying experience for me,” the woman said. “The mafia discussed killing me and other things like that,” she added – after denouncing that a lion cub was being exposed on social media and calling on the authorities to act.

The rise in popularity of lions is also being influenced by the appearances of public figures alongside them. Albanian rapper “Noizy” appeared in a video on “TikTok” playing with two lions – his manager did not comment on the case when asked.

He also got involved in a TV prank, assuming he had bought a lion and called fellow rapper “Stresi” directly, who, not realizing he was on national television, started talking about a real case – which was implied to be Ervis Martinaj’s lion.

“TV shows often feature exotic animals like wolves or snakes and interview their owners for entertainment, captivating the public in Kosovo,” commented Arif Aliu, worriedly from across the border.

“The sentence is too low.” The environmentalist appealed for the law to take people seriously for this type of crime, adding, “It’s not that we lack the legal basis to prosecute crimes, but it’s the implementation that is lacking.”

“Influencers” on social media are also part of the impressive lion shows. Stefan Janković is a young man in Serbia who appeared raising a lion cub with both hands – He counts at least 3 million combined followers on Instagram, TikTok and YouTube.

From “TikTok” to “Pet Shops”, the illegal trafficking route

The monopoly on the transfer and keeping of exotic animals such as lions and tigers in the Balkans is held by “zoological units”, i.e. certified zoos – mainly state-owned, which exchange them with each other according to needs in the region and beyond.

“There is no price for them, there is no legal market for the sale and purchase of lions and tigers”, explained veterinarian Ariel Vasili.

But in front of this is a reality where the illegal trade in wild animals ranks as the fourth largest criminal activity worldwide, after arms, narcotics and human trafficking.

This market is worth around $ 23 billion a year according to the World Economic Forum. Mainly through “TikTok”, traffickers manage to easily find clients and camouflage themselves. Amfora discovered that in Albania and Kosovo, some traffickers hide under the guise of “Pet Shops”.

“Communicating with foreign mobile numbers and not with Albanian numbers is like a covert form to bypass traditional channels such as ‘Facebook’, which was previously used”, analyzed Xhemal Xherri, who follows and denounces such crimes through PPNEA (Center for the Conservation and Protection of the Natural Environment in Albania).

He explained that “TikTok” and “Instagram” are the most flexible and difficult tools to track. Websites are also used for the trade of various goods, where from an open search, in two different posts for “Tirana” and “Prishtina”, the same seller offered lion cubs for 9,000 euros.

“Prices range from 6,000 euros – when the main source is found – to 12,000 euros,” Sajmir Shehu estimated based on his research.

“Golem Dog Farm” (“Ferma e Qenve Golem”) continues to maintain its base in the village of the same name near Durrës. But it now also has its own pet shop in the capital. On its TikTok profile, a post with a lion cub is kept at the top of the page, as the most special animal that is traded.

A slightly rusty sign, not far from the coastline, shows that tucked away in a multi-story residential and service building, there is a pet shop, where the smell of dog excrement invades your senses dozens of meters away.

The man with zero hair, about fivetithes, he walked among the puppies, which were painted with care for several meters on a wall, accompanied by expressions of love and care for them.

But when asked about the four-legged members of the big cat family, he indicated that he could provide a lion cub within two weeks, for 3,000 to 4,000 euros each. However, after talking to his son on “WhatsApp” to close the deal, he turned around sharply, saying, “We don’t sell lions here!”.

Meanwhile, another pet store, “Pet Store Tirana”, promises to bring a lion to your home for 7,500 euros. But these are not the only ones, other traffickers offer lion and tiger cubs in a more camouflaged way.

When asked again two weeks later by phone whether they sell lions to private clients, the pet store in Golem refused to comment. But the rapid timing of the animals arrival has raised suspicions that the “farms” are located somewhere in or near the Balkans and that the trafficking is carried out illegally via land routes.

“From the data we have from the field and from social networks, it is a well-structured illegal market for smuggling wild and exotic animals, bypassing the CITES law, national and international laws on animal trade,” explained veterinarian Ariel Vasili – specialized in the treatment of cat species.

Albania is part of CITES – the International Convention on Endangered Species – and for any animal or bird classified internationally as endangered or rare, the transporter must have an export permit for their entry or exit from Albania.

The Ministry of Tourism and Environment is responsible for implementing CITES in Albania. But according to official data, the situation has no connection with the local reality. Similarly, from the observation in the region, excluding Kosovo which is not part of the convention, there is a lack of official data on lions discovered, proving that it is 100% illegal.

“There have been 2 cases of captivity of tiger and lion species in our territory, which have been seized and sent to shelters abroad, the ministry in Albania officially explained.

Also, from the analysis of 10-year data of all imports and exports, it does not appear that lion or tiger cubs have been officially introduced, except for the cited case of the private zoo in Fier and the new arrivals to the Tirana Zoo.

“This type of trade in exotic animals is a sector that generates a lot of income and connects many interest groups,” analyzed Xhemal Xherri from PPNEA.

“Of course, social networks are a very good way to promote this type of trade,” he added.

While it is suspected by several of our sources that some of these lion and tiger cubs pass illegally through land customs, the State Police stated that in 10 years it has not identified any such trafficking case.

“For the criminal offense ‘Trafficking in species protected areas of wild flora and fauna’, according to article 202/a of the Criminal Code, for the period 01.08.2014 – 01.08.2024, no cases have been identified, therefore no actions have been taken by the State Police and consequently no information is generated”, the police in Albania officially explained.

Also in Kosovo in various cities, pet stores have started advertising lion cubs for sale. At the end of May, “Smart Pet Shop” in Gjilan, offered 2 lion cubs for sale on Instagram.

“Hello dear customers, we inform you that the lions are no longer available. Thank you for your interest!”, the pet store wrote on “Instagram” on May 31 – But when asked by us, the merchant said that he only sells dogs, cats and parrots.

130 kilometers from there, there is “Pet Store Peja”, another pet store. “At the beginning of my business I didn’t know, I went to the website and saw that someone was offering tigers and lions, I posted them too,” the man explained.

“I posted them, but the police called me for two hours and I went to give a statement in Peja,” he added, but he still said he continued to offer other exotic animals, including small turtles, monkeys and dangerous snakes.

“I can pick them up from Belgrade whenever you want,” he said.

In Pristina, Arif Aliu of the Animal Rights Foundation suspects that the owner of the Peja shop uses his second business – a taxi service that operates throughout the Balkans – to move the protected species.

“We think the cubs are somewhere in Croatia or [somewhere else in] the Balkans, and he is simply advertising them to gauge interest before bringing them to Kosovo,” Aliu explained, fearing that the trend will soon flourish there as well.

The lions and tigers, according to analyses conducted by veterinarians, are not native to Africa and were not born in the wild. They were born to mothers held in captivity, and the diseases they carry have raised suspicions of a farm that could be in or near the Balkans.

“They say they bring them from Serbia That’s how they say, oh it came from Serbia,” veterinarian Ariel Vasili said, regarding most of the comments heard in Albania about the origin of these lions.

A health problem that has been talked about recently is that lions are starting to show problems with their knees, a health issue generally associated with inbreeding.

“We have started to see that even those from Serbia have problems with their knees because they [traffickers] probably have a little difficulty finding new pairs. Females are hard to find, they are also difficult to order,” Vasili analyzed for Media Amfora.

“The little information I have, they usually come through Kosovo from Serbia, or through Montenegro. But it is a little more difficult. “Through Kosovo, it is a little easier for them to enter through the Mitrovica region,” were the suspicions of Sajmir Shehu, who has worked with the “Four Paws” organization to send lions held in captivity abroad.

Suspicions are also increased by the fact that traffickers – pet stores – promise that they can arrive in 2 weeks. Amfora searched for possible traces of two suspected farms in the territory of Belgrade and Niš, but their existence was not identified.

“Everything about animals in one place”, this is the motto of the young man who identifies himself with the nickname “Dani Tarzan” on social media platforms like Instagram, TikTok and Facebook. He is thought to be originally from Dubai and lives in Serbia, also presenting himself under the name “Dani Al Aloush”.

He looks to be in his 30s and first appeared on Instagram in 2022 and a year later on TikTok. From lions, to tigers, including other exotic animals like monkeys and snakes, he has decided his phone numbers to sell the animals, birds and reptiles he trades.

“I don’t have it in Serbia, it’s in Dubai,” he said when asked about the lions, avoiding confrontation with reporters. The videos show that he keeps the animals in an apartment with lowered shutters, where a long weapon, similar to a rifle, is also visible and there is a green space outside. Relevant authorities in Serbia did not respond to requests for information on the situation.

“Of course, in Serbia, as in any country that borders the EU, there is this concern about the illegal trade in animals,” said Belgrade veterinarian Kristijan Ovari, adding that authorities have not shared the results of any  investigations that they may have done to uncover sellers or traders of tigers and lions.

But he suspects that there is as much demand for illegal lion cubs in Serbia as there is in Albania. “People like that are more likely to have a pit bull or something like that [lions and tigers],” he said.

However, a chain of responsible authorities in Serbia did not respond to requests for information about the situation there.

Accidental discoveries, hundreds may be hidden in the Balkans

Near the border with Hungary, on the outskirts of Subotica, local police were notified by a resident who could not believe his eyes about what he had seen. A lion cub, seemingly exhausted but not at all scared – which is suspected to have been used to people – was wandering around.

The easiest solution for the police in these cases was the nearby Palić Zoo, where the female cub was sent in September 2023.

For the zoo staff, it was no surprise, since in 2022 the police had also “dumped” a rescued lion cub there, forgetting to search for the perpetrators to the end.

In the first case, “The male lion had kidney problems, but has since recovered,” explained Sonja Mandić, the director of the Palić Zoo, where she has worked for 15 years, to Amfora.

Similar cases were also identified in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia, where lion cubs were seen on the streets and on social media, which although remain isolated cases, the authorities have launched investigations – which have not yielded any serious findings so far.

“We see that more lions and other big cats are ending up in private ownership,” said Simone Schuls, the Sanctuary Manager from “Four Paws“, in an interview in a big cat rehabilitation center in the tiny Dutch village of Nijeberkoop – and lions kept in captivity in the Balkans have also ended up for treatment, including the lions that were rescued from Fier and from Montenegro. “It is expected that in the coming decades, many such animals will need shelters,” she added.

“At a young age they can be kept in home conditions, but when they grow up, they pose a danger to those who keep them, to their relatives, but also to society in general,” commented her colleague, Afrim Mahmuti.

“These are not pets, but they don’t understand,” added Mahmuti, the Kosovo director of the organization “Four Paws”, which has built the “Bear Sanctuary”, an environment where bears and one lion – Djoni – rescued from captivity in Albania and Kosovo are rehabilitated and live.

The high number of lions and tigers kept in private facilities in Albania and the Balkans has raised concerns about the future of their treatment, processes that require dedicated spaces and high costs for maintenance and food – while to date there is no regional center for keeping them in case of rescue.

“The zoo usually helps, but our problem is that we have very limited resources. We can’t accept many animals,” analyzed the veterinarian of the Belgrade Zoo, Kristijan Ovari, worriedly for Amfora.

As the number of lions kept illegally in private facilities in the Balkans increases from time to time, the pace of authorities is much lower for preventing the creation of a large population, which will require millions of euros of investment in their capture and treatment in the near future.

“This article was developed with the support of Journalismfund Europe”

Authors: Geri Emiri – Director of Amfora Media and investigative journalist focused on issues of damage to cultural heritage and environmental crime;
Ingrid Gercama – Investigative journalist reporting on environmental crime, politics and trade from the Balkans and Africa;
Nathalie Bertrams – Documentary photographer and journalist reporting on environmental conflict and social justice;
Vjosa Çerkini – Multimedia journalist and documentary producer from Kosovo.

The post Tigers and lions, the trend of Albanian crime bosses is infecting the Balkans first appeared on Amfora.

In Vlora they left deep traces and had a large community, so that in 1520, out of about 4,000 inhabitants of the city, more than 2,700 were Jews.

The Jews of Vlora built a synagogue there and today their toponymy is still preserved in the city. Learn more about the model coexistence they built in Vlora, through the memories in the video above, of Skënder Spahiu, currently director of Local Museums in Vlora, which also tells about the museum project that will present their history in Albania.

Video team:

Producer and narrator: Geri Emiri

Historical information: Dorian Hatibi

Video-Production: Arlind Veshti

References:

1. Jakoel Josef. Izraelitët në Shqipëri. Tiranë 2020;

2. Grup Autorësh. Fjalori Enciklopedik Shqiptar. Tiranë 2008;

3. Nika Nevila. Jews in the central state archive. Tiranë 2016.

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